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Effective Criminal Appellate Advocacy:
Seeking Reversal by Concurrent Collateral
and Direct Attacks in the
Appellate Court
By GERALD Z. MARERt*
Introduction-The Need for Improved Criminal
Appellate Advocacy
CALIFORNIA provides as a matter of right' for an appeal from
criminal convictions. In fiscal year 1973-74, 3,300 such appeals were
filed in the California courts of appeal.2 Of these appeals, 2,455 in-
volved court-appointed counsel.3 In the same year, the California Su-
preme Court appointed counsel in twenty-two4 of the forty-four criminal
appeals5 which it decided to hear. A comparable volume of such ap-
peals confronts courts both in other states and in the federal system.'
t The author wishes to dedicate this article to his father, Jack W. Marer, of
the Nebraska Bar.
* B.A. 1959, University of Michigan; J.D. 1963, Stanford Law School. The au-
thor gratefully acknowledges the assistance and advice given him by Alan G. Marer, Mi-
chael R. Flicker, and William T. Keogh.
1. Compare CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 1237, 1237.5, 1538.5(m) (West 1970) (appeals
from superior courts) with id. § 1466(2) (appeals from inferior courts).
2. JUDICIAL COUNCIL oF CALIFORNIA, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADMINSRATIVn
OFFIcE OF CALIFORNiA CouRTS 72 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 JUDICIAL COUNCIL.
REPORT].
3. Id. at 19. An indigent appellant is constitutionally entitled to court-ap-
pointed counsel on appeal in California, since the appeal is a matter of right. See note
108 infra.
4. See 1975 JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 2, at 19.
5. See id. at 71. Owing to the abolition of the death penalty and the automatic
appeal therefrom to the supreme court, there were no direct criminal appeals to the su-
preme court in 1973-74. 1975 JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 2, at 69. Also
filed with the supreme court were 757 original criminal proceedings, which constituted
eighty percent of all original proceedings. Id.
6. See, e.g., Kaufman, Does the Tudge Have a Right to Qualified Counsel?, 61
A.B.A.J. 569 (1975); Swygert, Bench and Bar Work Together in the Seventh Circuit,
61 A.B.A.J. 613 (1975).
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In light of these statistics, it is not surprising that the quality of
representation by counsel in criminal appeals has varied widely.1 This
inconsistency is due in part to the uncertainty of appellate attorneys
concerning the standards to which they will be held.8 Although an
abundance of literature' and numerous cases1" discuss the standards for
measuring the adequacy of criminal trial counsel, no articles have dealt
specifically with standards for measuring the adequacy of criminal
appellate representation,'1 despite the emergence in recent years of
decisions which have held constitutionally inadequate representation by
appellate counsel.12 This situation indicates the need for delineation of
guidelines for effective criminal appellate representation.
7. See People v. Echstrom, 43 Cal. App. 3d 996, 1002-03, 118 Cal. Rptr. 391,
395 (1974), (inadequate counsel at trial); In re Greenfield, 11 Cal. App. 3d 536, 89
Cal. Rptr. 847 (1970); see also United States ex rel. Johnson v. Vincent, 370 F. Supp.
379 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). The court in Greenfield stated that "the routine work of an
appellate court discloses wide variations in the quality of professional services supplied
by litigation lawyers . . . . In representing indigent criminal appellants, many court-
appointed attorneys display praiseworthy capabilities and zeal. Others are saved from
disaster by the care of the court and its research staff." In re Greenfield, 11 Cal. App.
3d at 544, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 851. See also People v. Peter, 55 I1. 2d 443, 303
N.E.2d 398 (1973). One commentator has stated: "judges are increasingly troubled by
the growing number of instances of poor legal representation encountered even in our
nation's highest courts." Kaufman, Does the Judge Have a Right to Qualified Counsel?,
61 A.B.A.J. 569 (1975). The Administrative Office of the California Courts describes
appellate counsel in the following terms: "Assigned [appellate] counsel are frequently
inexperienced, and the level of representation furnished by assigned counsel is uneven
and frequently only marginally adequate . . . . The result of these deficiencies is not
merely to give unequal representation to appellants, but to impose added work upon the
courts of appeal and upon the office of the Attorney General." 1975 JUDICIAL COUNCIL
REPORT, supra note 2, at 19-20.
8. The standards of representation are the same for appointed and retained appel-
late counsel. See Nickols v. Gagnon, 454 F.2d 467, 471 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
408 U.S. 925 (1972); People v. Scobie, 36 Cal. App. 3d 97, 111 Cal. Rptr. 600 (1973);
Abraham v. State, 228 Ind. 179, 91 N.E.2d 358 (1950). See also West v. Louisiana,
478 F.2d 1026, 1032 (5th Cir. 1973) (sixth amendment right to adequate counsel ap-
plies to a defendant who retains his own counsel as well as to defendants with state ap-
pointed counsel).
9. See, e.g., Bazelon, Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. C1N. L. REV. 1
(1973); Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and Certifi-
cation of Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice?, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 227
(1973); Bines, Remedying Ineffective Representation in Criminal Cases: Departures
for Habeas Corpus, 59 VA. L. REV. 927 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Bines]; Finer,
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 1077 (1973).
10. See Kaus & Mallen, The Misguiding Hand of Counsel-Reflections on Crimi-
nal Malpractice, 21 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1191, 1197 n.14 (1974) (California cases discuss-
ing adequacy of trial counsel).
11. For a discussion of the functional advocacy role of counsel in the criminal
process, see Palmer, Implementing the Obligation of Advocacy in Review of Criminal
Convictions, 65 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 267 (1974).
12. See United States ex rel. Johnson v. Vincent, 370 F. Supp. 379 (S.D.N.Y.
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The nature of appellate proceedings' 3 and the type of work re-
quired in a criminal appeal afford counsel more time for study and
reflection"4 and present less risk of surprise than he experiences in trial
proceedings. The scope of tactical and strategic decisions in an appeal is
more confined. 15 Counsel has numerous guides to the mechanics of both
brief writing and oral argument,' 6 and to the potential issues to be
considered on every criminal appealY.1 Thus, the general standards for
1974); Smotherman v. Beto, 276 F. Supp. 579, 589 (N.D. Tex. 1967); In re Greenfield,
11 Cal. App. 3d 536, 89 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1974). There may be other cases in California,
but in 1973-74, only 7% of the criminal decisions of the courts of appeal were published.
1975 JuDIcIAL CouNciL REPORT, supra note 2, at 82. See generally, Kanner, Unpub-
lished Appellate Opinions-Friend or Foe, 48 CALIF. ST. B.J. 387 (1973).
13. An appeal is limited to the "four corners" of the clerk's transcript and re-
porter's transcript. See People v. Merriam, 66 Cal. 2d 390, 396-97, 426 P.2d 161, 165,
58 Cal. Rptr. 1, 5 (1967). The skills required, which include study of the record, re-
search, brief writing, and oral argument, are taught in most law schools in moot court
programs and appellate advocacy courses.
14. Counsel's time is spent primarily studying the record, researching, thinking,
and brief writing. Extensions of time to file briefs are available, and such extensions
are routinely granted. See CAL. Sup. Cr. & Ors. OF APP. R. 43. As one court has
put it: "After all, appellate counsel is blessed with the gift of hindsight as he leisurely
picks over the carcass of a dead lawsuit." People v. Eckstrom, 43 Cal. App. 3d 996,
1001, 118 Cal. Rptr. 391, 394 (1974). The required information on procedure is readily
available. See generally Sup. Cr. & Cs. OF APP. R. 1-76; CoMMrrrEa ON CoNTrIrUN
EDUCATION OF TnE BAR, STATE BAR OF CALIFoRNIA, 2 CALIFoRNIA CRII nAL LAw PRAc-
ICE §§ 20.1-.162 (1969) [hereinafter cited as CALIFORNIA CanmiNAL LAw PRACTICE];
B. WrraN, CAL. CRnm. PnocE~u §§ 680-717 (2d ed. 1963 & Supp. 1973) [hereinafter
cited as Wrr=I].
15. See People v. Eckstrom, 43 Cal. App. 3d 996, 118 Cal. Rptr. 391 (1974). The
court in Eckstrom noted that appellate counsel, unlike trial counsel, is not confronted
with "minute to minute and second to second strategic and tactical decisions." Id. at
1001, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 394.
16. See, e.g., COMNITEE ON CoNTINuiNG EDUCATION OF TEE BAR, STATE BAR OF
CALIFORNIA, CALIFORNIA CIvIL APPELLATE PRACTICE (1966); Couch, Writing the Appel-
late Brief, 17 PRAC. LAW. 27 (1971); Magidson, Preparation and Argument of the Crim-
inal Appeal, 62 J. Cum. L.C. & P.S. 173 (1971).
The rules of court suggest appropriate contents for appellate briefs. CAL. Sup. Or.
& Ors. OF APP. R. 13, 15, 37. See also People v. Feggans, 67 Cal. 2d 444, 432 P.2d
21, 62 Cal. Rptr. 419 (1967). For a discussion of how appellate courts operate and
how one is to adjust his brief writing and oral argument to differences in courts, see
NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, THE CALIFORNIA COURTS OF APPEAL (1974);
Kaufman, Pre-Argument Conference: An Appellate Procedural Reform, 74 CoLUM. L.
Ruv. 1094 (1974); Molinari, The Decision Making Conference of the California Court
of Appeal, 57 CALIF. L. Rav. 606 (1969); Traynor, Some Open Questions on the Work
of State Appellate Courts, 24 U. Cm. L. REv. 211 (1957).
17. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA CRMINAL LAW PRAcncF, supra note 14, §§ 20.75-.86
(1969) (itemization of grounds for reversal in recent United States Supreme Court and
California Supreme Court decisions); WrrKiN, supra note 14, § 738 (list of possible
grounds for reversal); Zagel, Supreme Court Review 1973, 64 . CaRIM. L.C. & P.S. 379
(1973) (annual review of decisions of the United States Supreme Court); The Su-
preme Court of California, 1972-1973, Criminal Law and Procedure, 62 CALIF. L. REv.
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representation by appellate counsel should be easier to delineate than
those for trial counsel. 8 Nevertheless, appellate counsel, concerned with
the peculiarities of each individual appeal, must determine on a case by
case basis what is required to discharge the constitutional duty owed to
his client.
An appellate counsel's primary duty has been to seek reversal
based on the record on appeal. Recent California decisions, however,
illustrate that this practice of limiting review to the record on appeal
may be inadequate. In appropriate cases, appellate counsel must investi-
gate the entire case to determine whether there is evidence outside the
record on appeal which might arguably have achieved a more favorable
result for the defendant had it been presented at trial. Moreover, these
decisions indicate that when such evidence exists, counsel should collat-
erally attack the conviction during the pendency of the appeal by filing a
petition for an appropriate writ in the court in which the appeal is
pending. One recent case, People v. Lang,19 suggests that such a duty of
investigation currently exists. At the least, these recent opinions prepare
the way for the establishment of such a duty.
This article will discuss, from a conceptual and practical stand-
point, the duties of an attorney in a criminal appeal. The development of
the constitutional standards of adequate appellate representation will be
described, with emphasis on the recent cases indicating the need for
requiring, in appropriate cases, an investigation beyond the record on
appeal. The article will suggest procedures which can be used to meet
this requirement, especially methods applicable to situations in which
arguable grounds for reversal are found outside the record on appeal. It
is hoped that this article will be a source of practical and useful
information for the practicing attorney, will help improve the quality of
appellate advocacy, and will contribute to the effective administration of
justice.
309, 495-576 (1974) (annual review of decisions of the Supreme Court of California);
The United States Courts of Appeals: 1973-74 Term, Criminal Law & Procedure, 63
GEo. L.J. 325 (1974) (an annual issue on the criminal case decisions of all federal
courts of appeals by topic, showing grounds of reversal); The Supreme Court, 1973
Term, 88 HAIv. L. REv. 1 (1974) (annual review of decisions of the United States
Supreme Court).
18. See Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel for the Indigent Defendant, 78
HAsv. L. REv. 1434 (1965). "It would seem, however, that problems at that stage will
be less difficult than those involving trial counsel, because there is a greater consensus
concerning methods of effective appellate advocacy than concerning trial tactics, because
reviewing courts will be more familiar with the normal standard of competence of the
appellate lawyer, and because appellate courts can request that counsel argue issues that
have been omitted." Id. at 1447.
19. 11 Cal. 3d 134, 520 P.2d 393, 113 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1974).
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Appellate Counsel's Primary Duty Is To Raise
Every Arguable Issue
Standards for appellate representation in criminal appeals were
first articulated in Anders v. California.2" Defendant Anders, after
a felony conviction, was assigned court-appointed counsel for his appeal
to the California Court of Appeal. H1is counsel concluded the appeal was
without merit, informed the court of his conclusion in a "no-merit
letter", and asked to be relieved. The court of appeal relieved him, and
with only appellant's pro per brief before it, affirmed the conviction.
In a subsequent attack on the court of appeal's affirmance of the
conviction, the United States Supreme Court held the no-merit letter
procedure unconstitutional as denying an indigent appellant the assist-
ance of counsel.21 The Court said that the no-merit procedure violated
counsel's duty to "act in the role of an active advocate .. . as opposed
to that of amicus curiae. '2 2 Fulfilling this duty, the Court said, no
matter how frivolous an appeal may appear, requires that appointed
counsel present a brief raising any "arguable" issue contained in the
record, in conjunction with a no-merit letter.23
Subsequently, in the same year Anders was decided, the California
Supreme Court dealt with the no-merit letter procedure in People v.
Feggans.24 As in Anders, the appellant had court-appointed counsel for
the court of appeal proceedings. Counsel concluded the appeal was
without merit, so informed the court with a no-merit letter, and request-
ed leave to withdraw, which was granted. Counsel's letter set forth seven
potential assignments of error, some based on discussions with appellant
20. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
21. For a discussion of what counsel must do even though he concludes the appeal
is without merit, see AMERICAN BAR AssocuroN, STANDARDS wrrH COMMENTARY Rn-
LATrNG TO CRIM AA APPEALS 74-80 (1970) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDs];
Herman, Frivolous Criminal Appeals, 47 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 701 (1972); Note, Withdrawal
of Counsel from Frivolous Appeals, 49 IND. L.J. 740, 748 (1974); cf. Doherty, Wolf!
Wolf I-The Ramifications of Frivolous Appeals, 59 1. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 1 (1968). See
also People v. Woodard, 33 Cal. App. 3d 930, 109 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1973) (In this
case, the court-appointed appellate counsel filed a brief raising issues suggested by appel-
lant and then withdrew; the court examined the record for "even remotely arguable" is-
sues, found none, and dismissed the appeal.) In People v. Price, 1 Cal. App. 3d 982,
82 Cal. Rptr. 55 (1969), appellate counsel filed a no-merit letter, and the appeal was
affirmed. Thereafter, appellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the su-
preme court, which treated the petition as a motion to recall the remittitur and rein-
stated the appeal; the court of appeal subsequently reaffirmed the judgment. Id. at 985,
82 Cal. Rptr. at 57.
22. 386 U.S. at 744.
23. Id.
24. 67 Cal. 2d 444, 432 P.2d 21, 62 Cal. Rptr. 419 (1967).
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and others based on the record, but proceeded to argue against appel-
lant's position on those points. The court of appeal affirmed the
conviction.
The California Supreme Court, although affirming the conviction,
after the case had been rebriefed and reargued by new counsel25 in that
court, found that Feggans had been denied the assistance of counsel in
the court of appeal. The supreme court stated that the duty of appellate
counsel was to prepare a brief which must "discuss the legal issues . . .
and argue all the issues that are arguable. '26 For example, although the
court declined to apply to Feggans's case, still pending on appeal, the
recently guaranteed right to counsel at a lineup, it indicated that ap-
pointed counsel had been remiss in failing to raise the issue because it
was "arguable."
In re Smith, 2 7 decided in 1970, was the first California Supreme
Court decision to apply the Anders-Feggans arguable issue standard for
appellate counsel and to hold appellate representation inadequate. In
this case, after the court of appeal affirmed felony convictions for rape,
kidnapping, and attempted kidnapping, appellant filed a pro per peti-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court,
alleging he had been denied effective assistance of counsel in the court
of appeal. The supreme court treated the petition as requesting recall of
the remittitur28 issued by the court of appeal, for the purpose of rein-
vesting that court with jurisdiction to rehear the appeal. Finding that
representation by appellate counsel had been inadequate, the supreme
court ordered that the appeal be reinstated in the court of appeal, and
that it be rebriefed and reargued by "competent counsel. 29
25. Although it found that the appellant had received inadequate representation
in the court of appeal, the supreme court apparently felt that any error had been cor-
rected by appointment of new counsel for the hearing in the supreme court. See id.
at 448, 432 P.2d at 23-24, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 421-22.
26. Id. at 447, 432 P.2d at 23, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 421.
27. 3 Cal. 3d 192, 474 P.2d 969, 90 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970).
28. After a case becomes final in the court of appeal, by expiration of the time
to seek a hearing in the supreme court or when such hearing is denied, the court of
appeal issues a document entitled a "remittitur" to the lower court. This procedure sig-
nifies in essence that the judgment of the lower court is final. See CAL. SUP.
CT. & CTS. OF ApP. R. 25, 27, 28, 68. Even after a remittitur is issued, how-
ever, a litigant may petition the appellate court which issued the remittitur to "re-
call the remittitur," alleging grounds which may include the ground of ineffective
counsel on appeal. CAL. SUP. CT. & CTS. OF APP. R. 25(d). See In re Smith, 3 Cal.
3d 192, 474 P.2d 969, 90 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970). See generally WITKIN, supra note 14,
§§ 735-37. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus may be used for the same purpose.
See In re Smith, 3 Cal. 3d 192, 474 P.2d 969, 90 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970); In re Martin,
58 Cal. 2d 133, 373 P.2d 103, 23 Cal. Rptr. 167 (1962).
29. 3 Cal. 3d at 203-04, 474 P.2d at 976, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 8. Federal courts also
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The supreme court found that original appellate counsel had failed
to raise "crucial assignments of error, which arguably might have result-
ed in a reversal."30 Appellate counsel's brief consisted of only a twenty
page statement of facts and a one page argument, which stated that the
conviction should be reversed because the state failed to prove expressly
that appellant was not married to the rape victim. Describing this
argument as "ludicrous," especially since appellant had testified he was
not married, the court found that each count on which appellant was
convicted "was potentially vulnerable to legitimate and provocative ap-
pellate contentions that should have been manifest to an alert and
responsive attorney."3' Specifically, the court said that on the basis of
the record, counsel should have argued the possible invalidity of the
lineup procedure, the possible "tainting" of the in-court identification by
the lineup, and the possible insufficiency of the evidence supporting
crucial elements of the attempted kidnapping count. The court stated
that it catalogued the "plausible" and "arguable" contentions that coun-
sel might have raised in appellant's behalf, "not because [it concluded]
that petitioner was likely to obtain a reversal on appeal, but only to
demonstrate that his appellate counsel [had not rendered] the thought-
ful assistance to which he was entitled. 32
order the appeal to be rebriefed and reargued by competent counsel if appellant was de-
nied competent counsel on the original appeal. See Arrastia v. United States, 455 F.2d
736 (5th Cir. 1972). In separate cases, the California Supreme Court and a California
court of appeal, upon briefs and arguments on a petition for habeas corpus, reversed
without reinstating the appeal after holding the prior appellate representation inadequate.
Compare In re Banks, 4 Cal. 3d 337, 482 P.2d 215, 93 Cal. Rptr. 591 (1971) with
In re Greenfield, 11 Cal. App. 3d 536, 89 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1970). But see People v.
Scobie, 36 Cal. App. 3d 97, 111 Cal. Rptr. 600 (1973) (petition to recall the remittitur
was denied, after the court had reexamined the merits of the case and the original appel-
late counsel's performance and had found that there were no arguable points missed by
the original counsel.) In People v. Wells, 261 Cal. App. 2d 468, 68 Cal. Rptr. 400
(1968), a motion to recall the remittitur was denied after consideration of a claim of
denial of counsel on appeal. A motion to recall the remittitur or a petition for habeas
corpus is also proper to reinstate an appeal if without fault of appellant, appellate coun-
sel failed to file an opening brief and this failure resulted in dismissal of the appeal.
In re Martin, 58 Cal. 2d 133, 373 P.2d 103, 23 Cal. Rptr. 167 (1962).
30. 3 Cal. 3d at 202, 474 P.2d at 975, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
31. Id. at 198, 474 P.2d at 972, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 4.
32. Id. at 202, 474 P.2d at 975, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 7. In the next case in which
the court held that the representation of appointed counsel in the court of appeal had
been inadequate, counsel had failed to argue issues on which the case had been remanded
by the United States Supreme Court. In re Banks, 4 Cal. 3d 337, 482 P.2d 215, 93
Cal. Rptr. 591 (1971). See also People v. Ruiz, 14 Cal. 3d 163, 534 P.2d 712, 120
Cal. Rptr. 872 (1975), in which appellate counsel failed to challenge the lack of evi-
dence supporting the conviction for possession of heroin for sale; on appeal, the state
raised the issue and, on that issue, the judgment was reversed.
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Subsequent to Feggans and Smith, a series of California cases
further elucidated the requirements for adequate appellate representa-
tion. In People v. Rhoden,33 after an unsuccessful appeal from serious
felony convictions resulting in a sentence of life without possibility of
parole, appellant petitioned the supreme court for recall of the remitti-
tur, on the ground that he had been denied effective counsel in the court
of appeal. Once again the supreme court reinstated the appeal in the
court of appeal, this time holding that the failure of counsel "to raise
crucial assignments of error, which arguably might have resulted in a
reversal deprived [appellant] of the effective assistance of appellate
counsel to which he was entitled under the Constitution. ' 4
Counsel in this case had filed only a six page brief, consisting of
two pages reciting the case history, two pages summarizing the facts,
and one page presenting the sole argument for reversal, that the trial
court was guilty of an abuse of discretion in denying a pretrial motion to
sever certain counts. The court found this argument patently without
merit. More importantly, however, the representation provided on ap-
peal was held inadequate because counsel had not raised "colorable
assignments of error" which were contained in the record. Those "colora-
ble assignments" involved the instructions on kidnapping and the suffi-
ciency of the evidence to establish critical elements of the kidnapping
charges. The court said that "an appealing case" could have been
presented on these issues, which the court found were "certainly argua-
ble," and plausibly meritorious.35
The failure of counsel to bring controlling cases before either the
trial court or the appellate court was the issue in In re Greenfield.36 In
Greenfield, appellant's felony convictions had been affirmed on appeal.
Neither trial nor appellate counsel had raised an obvious pre-emption
issue based on two well-known California cases. Had that issue been
presented, defendant could have been convicted of only a misde-
meanor, not a felony, and the appellate court would have been re-
quired to reverse as a matter of law.
In a habeas corpus proceeding, the court of appeal held that both
trial and appellate counsel had been inadequate and that their failure to
raise the pre-emption issue had resulted in the loss of a "crucial defense
on appeal.I 37 The court noted that while appellate counsel had cited
33. 6 Cal. 3d 519, 492 P.2d 1143, 99 Cal. Rptr. 751 (1972).
34. Id. at 529, 492 P.2d at 1149, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 757.
35. Id.
36. 11 Cal. App. 3d 536, 89 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1970).
37. Id. at 541, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 849. If the court's search in Greenfield for a "cru-
[Vol. 27
Hale's Pleas of the Crown, he had failed to cite the two California cases
bearing on the main issue in the case, even though those cases could
have been found by "a half hour of rudimentary research-resort to a
citator, a digest, [or] an annotated code .... -1 Because trial counsel
had also proved inadequate, the court vacated the judgment and re-
manded the case to the trial court rather than reinstating the appeal.
The most recent California Supreme Court case addressing the
standards of appellate advocacy is People v. Lang.s9 Appellant in that
case was convicted of lewd acts with children, which had allegedly taken
place in a room full of people during a party. Appellant was also
committed as a mentally disordered sex offender. The convictions and
commitment were affirmed by the court of appeal. Lang filed a pro per
petition for hearing in the supreme court,40 alleging inadequacy of
appellate counsel, who had filed only a three and one-half page brief
directed at the validity of the commitment and devoid of argument for
reversal of the convictions.
The supreme court, reinstating the appeal in the court of appeal,
found appellate counsel inadequate because, on the basis of the record,
(1) he had failed to argue that the trial judge had misapplied the
presumption of innocence and in effect had placed the burden of proof
on appellant; (2) he had failed to argue incompetency of trial counsel,
about which "there appeared to be some basis for argument"; and
(3) he had failed to argue that the assaults on the victims were physical-
ly impossible, even though the court noted that, "it seems apparent that
a strong argument could have been made that the [victim's] testimony
was inherently improbable and insubstantial."41
The lesson of the above cases is that appellate counsel has a duty to
cial" error by appellate counsel is read to mean that the error had to require a reversal,
the court was using an improper test, as is shown in later supreme court cases. See
People v. Lang, 11 Cal. 3d 134, 520 P.2d 393, 113 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1974); People v. Rho-
den, 6 Cal. 3d 519, 492 P.2d 1143, 99 Cal. Rptr. 751 (1972); In re Banks, 4 Cal. 3d
337, 482 P.2d 215, 93 Cal. Rptr. 591 (1971). In In re Smith, 3 Cal. 3d 192, 474 P.2d
969, 90 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970), the court said counsel had failed to raise "crucial assign-
ments of error." The court noted, however, that it did not mean to intimate that these
errors were even likely to result in a reversal. Id. at 202-03, 474 P.2d at 966, 90 Cal.
Rptr. at 7-8. Furthermore, counsel has often been held inadequate for failing to present
grounds for reversal which are merely the least likely to succeed. See In re Smith, 3
Cal. 3d 192, 203, 474 P.2d 969, 976, 90 Cal. Rptr. 1, 8 (1970). See note 44 & accom-
panying text infra.
38. 11 Cal. App. 3d at 544, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 851.
39. 11 Cal. 3d 134, 520 P.2d 393, 113 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1974).
40. See id. at 136, 520 P.2d at 394, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 10.
41. Id. at 139, 520 P.2d at 404, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 12.
November 1975] CRIMINAL APPELLATE ADVOCACY
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
raise every arguable issue4 2 regardless of whether or not he believes the
argument is meritorious enough to prevail. 3 The cases also suggest that
appellate counsel consider with caution the advice, often found in "how
to write appellate briefs" articles, that legal issues which counsel thinks
will not result in a reversal should not be raised or should be relegated to
an inconspicuous place in the brief. The pitfalls of such advice are
illustrated in Smith, Rhoden and Lang. In each of those cases appellate
counsel was held inadequate partly for failing to argue insufficiency of
the evidence and inherent improbability of witnesses' testimony, the two
arguments with the least chance of success on any appeal."4
The standards of appellate representation set forth in the above
cases require appellate counsel to present every arguable45 issue, even
42. He has no duty to "contrive arguable issues." In re Smith, 3 Cal. 3d at 198,
474 P.2d at 97, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 4. This duty includes urging change in the law.
"[C]ounsel serves both the court and his client by advocating change in the law if argu-
ment can be made supporting change." People v. Feggans, 67 Cal. 2d at 447, 432 P.2d
at 23, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 421; accord, Harders v. California, 373 F.2d 839, 842 n.3 (9th
Cir. 1967); People v. Rhoden, 6 Cal. 3d at 528 n.9, 492 P.2d at 11 n.9, 99 Cal. Rptr. at
757 n.9. See also ABA STANDARDS, supra note 21, at 296. However, in a recent case,
the supreme court rejected a claim that appellate counsel was incompetent because he
did not learn of and apprise the court of appeal of a decision of the supreme court
filed just two days before, which case in fact had no applicability to appellant's case,
and where the supreme court decision was filed two days before the court of appeal de-
nied appellant's petition for rehearing. In re Walker, 10 Cal. 3d 764, 518 P.2d 1129,
112 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1974).
43. Of course, he must raise issues that would result in reversal. See Johnson v.
Vincent, 370 F. Supp. 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). But see In re Yurko, 10 Cal. 3d 857, 519
P.2d 561, 112 Cal. Rptr. 513 (1974). In Yurko, appellant, on petition for habeas corpus,
claimed he had been inadequately represented on appeal because counsel had argued only
on the basis of California authority, rather than citing out-of-state authority. The court
summarily rejected this claim, saying that "this is not a case where, because of either
trial or appellate counsel's lack of diligence or skill" the appeal was reduced to "a farce
or a sham." Id. at 866, 519 P.2d at 567, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 519. Apparently, although
the court did not say so, there was no out-of-state authority that would have created
an "arguable issue" within the meaning of the Feggans, Smith, Rhoden, and Lang prin-
ciple.
44. See generally WITKIN, supra note 14, §§ 683-84. Witkin states that "It is ex-
tremely rare that an appellate court, in either a civil or criminal case, will reverse for
insufficiency of evidence alone." Id., § 685, at 669. "The inherent improbability rule
• . . is not a doctrine of appellate review. The appellate court will not substitute its
evaluation of the credibility of witnesses even though to some triers of fact the evidence
'would have seemed so improbable, impossible and unbelievable' as to compel a contrary
judgment." B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE § 1112, at 1029 (2d ed. 1966).
45. One court has suggested that counsel "need only present issues which he con-
siders arguable." People v. Eckstrom, 43 Cal. App. 3d 996, 1002, 118 Cal. Rptr. 391,
395 (1974). The court also said, "there is not compulsion on appellate counsel to carry
out his client's perhaps capricious whims by presenting issues which to him, from an
objective professional viewpoint, lack merit." Id. at 1002, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 395. See
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those which he consideres to be nonmeritorious, in its best light.46 What
constitutes an "arguable" issue depends on whether the issue was "cru-
cial in the context of the particular circumstances at hand. 14 7 When it is
doubtful whether an issue is arguable but nonmeritorious and must
therefore be raised,48 or whether it is frivolous and need not be raised,
counsel should resolve his doubt in favor of appellant by presenting the
issue to the court,49 thereby allowing the appellate justices to evaluate
the merit of each contention.
Appellate Counsel Should Seek a Reversal,
on or Outside the Record
The cases discussed above impose a constitutional duty on appel-
late counsel to raise every arguable issue contained in the record on
appeal. Nevertheless, traditional notions of justice may not always be
satisfied, and the validity of the guilt-finding process may be under-
mined if an appeal is limited solely to the record on appeal. Often
also Cardarella v. United States, 375 F.2d 222, 230 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 882; Finer, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 CoRNLL L. Rlv. 1077 (1973).
The court in Eckstrom was concerned with what it described as the ever increasing fre-
quency of attacks by appellate counsel on the competency of trial counsel.
46. Errors that individually could not result in a reversal can, when accumulated,
achieve that result. People v. Buffum, 40 Cal. 2d 709, 726, 256 P.2d 317, 326 (1953);
see generally WrrxN, supra note 14, § 756.
47. In re Smith, 3 Cal. 3d 192, 203, 474 P.2d 969, 975, 90 Cal. Rptr. 1, 7
(1970).
48. This distinction was discussed recently. See People v. Scobie, 36 Cal. App.
3d 97, 111 Cal. Rptr. 600 (1973). There the court was faced with a motion to recall
the remittitur on the ground that appellate counsel had failed to argue that the trial court
had erred in not instructing on a lesser included offense. The court, reviewing the entire
record on the merits and finding no substance to the motion, denied the motion. Inter-
estingly, the court noted that in light of In re Smith, 3 Cal. 2d 192, 474 P.2d 969, 90
Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970) and People v. Rhoden, 6 Cal. 3d 519, 492 P.2d 1143, 99 Cal. Rptr.
751 (1972), "we are required to judge not only the merits of the appeal, but the per-
formance of [appellate] counsel." People v. Scobie, 36 Cal. App. 3d at 99, 111 Cal.
Rptr. at 601. Apparently, some courts of appeal are tiring of frivolous arguments which
have been characterized, in a civil case, as a "prolonged, unwarranted imposition on the
court . . . as a consequence of [which] the Court of Appeal in every district does
process and decide numerous appeals of little merit." Parker v. Parker, 43 Cal. App.
3d 610, 614, 117 Cal. Rptr. 707, 710 (1974). See generally, Herman, Frivolous Crimi-
nal Appeals, 47 N.Y.U.L. REv. 701 (1973); Palmer, Implementing the Obligation of Ad-
vocacy in Review of Criminal Convictions, 65 J. Clum. L.C. & P.S. 267 (1974).
49. Cf. People v. Sumner, 262 Cal. App. 2d 409, 69 Cal. Rptr. 15 (1968). In
Sumner, the court dismissed the appeal as frivolous but recognized a distinction between
"a frivolous appeal and one which simply has no merit." The court implied that when
appellate counsel is in doubt about the distinction, he should resolve it in favor of raising
the issue and should not seek to withdraw from the case. Id. at 415, 69 Cal. Rptr. at
19.
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it is evidence outside the record which might have led to a disposition
more favorable to the defendant or might even have resulted in his
acquittal. The presentation of this evidence on appeal may conse-
quently prove crucial to setting aside the conviction."
The notion that appellate counsel must go beyond the record is
consonant with the policy underlying his role in the criminal process.
His duty, as declared by the Supreme Court in Entsminger v. Iowa,51 is
to "function in the active role of an advocate." 52 To be an effective
advocate, he must "not omit any essential honorable step in the defense,
[regardless of] his compensation or the nature of his appointment."53
To discharge his duty faithfully, counsel, especially one newly appointed
for the appeal, must undertake an extensive examination of the trial
transcript and the evidence presented by the defendant. 4 It is quite
possible that this investigation may raise problems not resolved in the
record. If counsel is to be an effective advocate, he cannot, consistent
with his duty not to omit any honorable step in the defense, fail to seek
resolution of these problems or fail to bring such resolution before the
court.
Faced with cases involving issues which can be resolved only by
material outside the record on appeal, the courts have recognized that it
is appropriate for counsel to examine the entire case and have perhaps
imposed on counsel the duty of undertaking this investigation. People v.
Lang,55 the latest decision addressing the problem, also provides the
most explicit suggestion of such a duty. In Lang, the California Supreme
Court ordered an appeal reinstated in the court of appeal because
appellate counsel had failed to argue crucial issues contained in the
record on appeal. One of the issues which the court ordered reargued
50. See In re Hochberg, 2 Cal. 3d 870, 471 P.2d 1, 87 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1970).
The court indicated that one result of poor trial representation may be a record insuffi-
cient to support an appeal, forcing resort to collateral remedies. Id. at 875, 471 P.2d
at 4, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 684.
51. 386 U.S. 748 (1967).
52. Id. at 751.
53. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION
FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION 174 (Approved Draft 1971).
One case suggests that oral argument in the appellate court may be an essential step
and hence should not be waived by counsel. People v. Lang, 11 Cal. 3d 134, 520 P.2d
393, 113 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1974). Nevertheless, some California courts of appeal seem to
encourage waiver of oral argument, and it appears that appellate counsel often do waive
it. In 1973, in Division One of the Fourth Appellate District, two-thirds of the criminal
appeals were submitted without oral argument. People v. Lang, 11 Cal. 3d 134, 144,
520 P.2d 393, 400, 113 Cal. Rptr. 9, 16 (Clark, J., dissenting).
54. See Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, 280-81 (1964).
55. 11 Cal. 3d 134, 520 P.2d 393, 113 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1974).
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was possible inadequacy of trial counsel. Significantly, the court stated:
Certainly, on renewal of defendant's appeal, counsel should ascer-
tain whether or not defendant received adequate trial represen-
tation. In the event the record is not conclusive of the question,
counsel should consider the possibility of alternative relief through
habeas corpus. 56
In dissent, Justice Clark reiterated that review on direct appeal was
limited to the trial court record and concluded that the record before
him did not support the contention that inadequacy of trial counsel was
a "critical" issue. Therefore, he disagreed with the majority's direction to
counsel that he consider collateral attack if the record was inadequate.
In Justice Clark's opinion:
[C]ounsel below was appointed to represent defendant on appeal,
[and therefore] properly limited his representation to matters
within the scope of appellate review. Counsel could not expect to
be reimbursed for investigating possible grounds for habeas corpus
relief, because a defendant's right to appointed counsel has not
been extended to applications for collateral relief. Therefore, it is
both unfair and unrealistic to suggest that defendant's appointed
counsel on appeal was ineffective if he did not conduct such an in-
vestigation. .... 57
The dissent in effect serves to highlight the implication in the majority's
opinion that appellate counsel has a duty to "consider" possible grounds
for collateral attack on matters outside the record on appeal, at least
when the record raises the possibility of such issues, and to initiate
collateral attack if such action is'appropriate under the circumstances of
the case.58
56. Id. at 141, 520 P.2d at 398, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 14.
57. Id. at 144, 520 P.2d 399, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 16 (dissent).
58. But cf. In re Golia, 16 Cal. App. 3d 775, 94 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1971). Golia
involved an appeal from kidnapping and grand theft convictions. Pending appeal, ap-
pellant personally filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme
Court, which transferred the petition to the court of appeal for consideration in conjunc-
tion with the appeal pending in that court. In that petition, appellant claimed his trial
counsel had been inadequate, and that he was being denied effective assistance of coun-
sel on the pending appeal, because appellate counsel had failed to file the very same
habeas corpus petition raising the inadequacy of trial counsel. The court of appeal held
that trial counsel had not been inadequate and further stated that court-appointed appel-
late counsel had no "duty to file or to prosecute an extraordinary writ believed to be
desirable or appropriate by the defendant." Id. at 786, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 330. Moreover,
the court could find no authority for such a duty. Id. Since trial counsel was held to
be adequate, however, the court's comment was dictum. In addition, the court dealt only
with the issue of a duty when an appellant desires appellate counsel to file a petition
for a writ. The court did not deal with the issue of a duty to file such a petition when
appellate counsel himself believes it is appropriate or is placed on notice of facts that
would justify such a duty. Finally, it should be noted that Golia preceded People v.
Lang and did not mention In re Ketchel, 68 Cal. 2d 397, 438 P.2d 625, 66 Cal. Rptr.
881 (1968).
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The court in In re Ketchel, 9 which concerned the issue of whether,
during an appeal, appointed counsel had the right, upon a proper
showing, to have appellant examined by a psychiatrist, alluded to the
propriety of appellate counsel's investigation of the entire case. The
attorney general opposed any examination, on the ground that it could
lead to no relevant evidence since the appeal was limited to the facts and
issues contained in the record on appeal. In rejecting this argument, the
court said that the psychiatrist might aid appellate counsel's right and
need to communicate personally with his client in order to develop his
argument on appeal,"' and that counsel's duty under Anders v. Califor-
nia would be promoted by "permitting counsel broad discretion in
deciding how to investigate and develop all potentially available
arguments." 61
The court in Ketchel went on to say that "[t]he assistance of the
informed psychiatrist could lead to possible bases for collateral attack"'' 2
and that "the results of the psychiatric examination, even if not of
direct use or 'admissible' on appeal, may well assist counsel's overall
strategy on both appeal and collateral remedies."63
Thus, the court in Ketchel directs that appellate counsel in seeking
grounds for reversal may look beyond the record and investigate the
entire case,64 even when nothing in the record itself suggests the exist-
ence of such grounds outside the record. Furthermore, the opinion in
Ketchel indicates that the court deems such effort by appellate counsel
proper.
Given that counsel may, and perhaps should in appropriate cases,
go beyond the record, the question arises as to the scope of such
investigation. Admittedly the scope of the investigation cannot be as
great as that required of trial counsel. Nevertheless, since the "standards
59. 68 Cal. 2d 397, 438 P.2d 625, 66 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1968).
60. Id. at 400, 438 P.2d at 627, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 883-84. ABA STANDARDS, supra
note 21, at 296; Smith v. Superior Ct., 68 Cal. 2d 547, 440 P.2d 65, 68 Cal. Rptr. 1
(1968). See In re Allison, 66 Cal. 2d 282, 425 P.2d 193, 57 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1967)
(importance of communication between appellate counsel).
61. 68 Cal. 2d at 402, 438 P.2d at 629, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 885 (1968) (emphasis
added).
62. Id. at 401, 438 P.2d at 628, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 884.
63. Id. at 400, 438 P.2d at 627, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 883.
64. In a 1970 case, the court reversed a conviction on the ground that the trial
court had refused to allow defendant to state his reasons for desiring removal of his trial
counsel. The record did not show any incompetency of his counsel, but the court said
"that is not the test," thus showing the importance of going beyond the record itself in
order to develop grounds for reversal. People v. Marsden, 2 Cal. 3d 118, 126, 465 P.2d
44, 49, 84 Cal. Rptr. 156, 161 (1970).
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of competence apply equally to trial and appellate counsel,' 65 cases
dealing with the duties of trial counsel in regard to preparation of a case
are relevant.66 Generally these related cases state the sixth amendment
requires "counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably
effective assistance." 67 Whether this standard is met in any particular
case is "a question of judgment and degree to be answered in light of all
of the circumstances and with a view to fundamental fairness."68
In order to fulfill the requirements for adequate assistance of
counsel, appellate counsel should make a reasonable investigation of the
case. Relevant California cases have talked of a duty "to investigate
65. Rawlins v. Craven, 329 F. Supp. 40, 42 (C.D. Cal. 1971); accord, Monsour
v. Cady, 342 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. Wis. 1972); cf. In re Saunders, 2 Cal. 3d 1033, 472
P.2d 921, 88 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1970). California provides by statute: "it is the duty
of an attorney... (h) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the
cause of the defenseless or the oppressed." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(h) (West
1974). This duty is applicable to appellate counsel. See Lascher v. California, 64 Cal.
2d 687, 414 P.2d 398, 51 Cal. Rptr. 270 (1966). As one court stated, "Whether an
attorney is appointed by the court or selected and paid by the [appellant], the same exer-
cise of professional judgment controls those decisions." People v. Scobie, 36 Cal. App.
3d 97, 100, 111 Cal. Rptr. 600, 602 (1973). See Nickols v. Gagnon, 454 F.2d 467, 471
(7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 925 (1972) (referring specifically to appellate
counsel).
66. See In re Smith, 3 Cal. 3d 192, 474 P.2d 969, 90 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970); In re
Ketchel, 68 Cal. 2d 397, 399-400, 438 P.2d 625, 627, 66 Cal. Rptr. 881, 883 (1968).
67. In re Saunders, 2 Cal. 3d 1033, 1041, 472 P.2d 921, 926, 88 Cal. Rptr. 633,
638 (1970). For a collection and discussion of recent cases adopting this standard, see
Comment, The Right to Competent Counsel: Emergence of a Sixth Amendment Stand-
ard of Review on Appeal and the Persistence of the "Sham and Farce" Rule in Cali-
fornia, 15 SANTA Ci.A IAW. 355, 364-76 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Right
to Competent Counsel].
Other language used to describe the standard of competency of counsel in criminal
case is instructive. "[W]ithdrawal of crucial defenses from the case, thereby reducing
the trial to a farce or sham . . . ." People v. Lang, 11 Cal. 3d at 142, 520 P.2d at
398, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 14. "[C]ounsel's lack of diligence or competence reduced the trial
to a 'farce or sham' . . . he did not effectively supply to a defendant those skills and
legal knowledge which we can reasonably expect from any member of the bar." People
v. Cook, 13 Cal. 3d 663, 672-73, 532 P.2d 148, 119 Cal. Rptr. 500, 506 (1975). The
"farce or sham" language has been severely criticized.
For a discussion of decisions concerning the proper standard and language used to
describe the standard, see Kaus & Mallen, supra note 10.
The "farce and sham" standard has been abandoned in numerous jurisdictions. See
cases collected in Comment, The Right to Competent Counsel, supra at 358 n.26.
68. In re Saunders, 2 Cal. 3d 1033, 1041, 472 P.2d 921, 926, 88 Cal. Rptr. 633,
638. The standard suggested in recent cases is that counsel must provide the skill and
competence of ordinary attorneys in criminal cases. See, e.g., Tollett v. Henderson, 411
U.S. 258, 266 (1972); Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974);
Comment, Right to Competent Counsel, supra note 67, at 369-76; Comment, Inadequate
Representation of Counsel in Criminal Cases: The Need for a New Approach, 9
U.S.F.L. REy. 166, 177-85 (1974).
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carefully all defenses of fact and of law that might have been available
to defendant. . . and to obtain such psychiatric and medical evidence
as might be relevant to the case .... 69 One court, discussing the duty
of appellate counsel in Wisconsin post-conviction proceedings, which
combine appeal with other challenges to conviction-essentially the
procedure suggested by the court in People v. Lang and In re Ketchel-
stated that counsel had a duty to make a "conscientious examination" of
the case.7
0
What constitutes a "conscientious examination" or a reasonable
investigation must, of course, be determined on a case by case basis.
Nonetheless, as will be discussed below, an examination of the complete
record in the trial court, including the offered and introduced evidence,
and interviews with the appellant himself and with his trial counsel,
would appear in most cases to meet the minimum requirements. After
this examination, if appellate counsel concludes that the record contains
all arguable grounds for reversal, then his efforts toward reversal may
properly be based solely on the appellate record. If, however, these
preliminary steps put counsel on notice of possible grounds for reversal
outside the record on appeal, counsel should and must investigate those
matters and, if appropriate, initiate collateral attack.
In general, both good practice and good sense require that counsel
review the entire case rather than restricting his investigation to the
record on appeal and that he discuss the case with both appellant and
trial counsel.7'1 Trial counsel may provide a helpful evaluation of the
errors to be urged on appeal, and both trial counsel and appellant may
offer useful information concerning the practical seriousness of those
errors. Although a successful criminal appeal is often based on the
69. People v. Lang, 11 Cal. 3d 134, 142, 520 P.2d 393, 398, 113 Cal. Rptr. 9,
14 (1974), citing In re Saunders, 2 Cal. 3d 1033, 472 P.2d 921, 88 Cal. Rptr. 633
(1970). See In re Williams, 1 Cal. 3d 168, 460 P.2d 984, 81 Cal. Rptr. 784 (1969);
People v. Welborn, 257 Cal. App. 2d 513, 65 Cal. Rptr. 8 (1968).
70. Monsour v. Cady, 342 F. Supp. 353, 360 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
71. See United States ex rel. Johnson v. Vincent, 370 F. Supp. 379 (S.D.N.Y.
1974); ABA STANDARDS, supra note 21, at 97. No such suggestion is contained in the
notice sent to appointed counsel by any of the California courts of appeal.
Contact with the trial defense counsel is helpful and may also be necessary in some
cases. See United States ex rel. Johnson v. Vincent, 370 F. Supp. 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1974);
cf. People v. Martinez, 14 Cal. 3d 533, 537, 535 P.2d 739, 741, 121 Cal. Rptr. 611,
613 (1975). In discussing trial counsel's conduct with regard to discovering possible
grounds for a motion to suppress evidence, the court in Martinez stated that counsel
"could have learned the grounds for a pretrial suppression motion by simply interviewing
his client." Id. at 537, 535 P.2d at 741, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 613. In re Ketchel, 68 Cal.
2d 397, 438 P.2d 625, 66 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1968), mentions the importance of appellate
counsel discussing the case with appellant. See text accompanying notes 59-64 supra.
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work of trial counsel who is able to recognize important procedural,
substantive, and constitutional issues and who has the foresight to
preserve them in the record for appeal, the effective pursuit of post-trial
remedies requires as well that appellate counsel ask a wide variety of
questions and examine a number of exhibits and other documents.
Questions concerning the information extraneous to the record which
counsel must ask merely to understand the record itself include the
following: What was the total evidence against appellant? What evi-
dence did trial counsel strive to keep out? Why was no ballistics expert
or criminalist called by the defense? What investigation was made of
appellant's mental condition or capacity? Why were certain witnesses
called or not called by the defense? Why did appellant testify or not
testify? Was there an illegal search and seizure? What was the nature
and extent of trial counsels investigation of the facts and research of the
law? Furthermore, the answers to these questions may reveal issues
either absent from or inadequately treated in the record.
The suggested inquiry of appellant and trial counsel should not
necessarily be viewed as second-guessing trial counsel; reasonable in-
quiry is simply prerequisite to a comprehensive understanding of the
case. With that understanding, appellate counsel should be able to avoid
both unjustified attacks on trial counsel's competency and unjustified
failure to challenge trial counsel's competency-two objectionable prac-
tices often noted by the courts.72
Appellate counsel has substantial means available to examine the
entire case for possible grounds for reversal. The reporter's transcript is
the basic source. Nonetheless, the clerk's transcript, which contains
minutes of every proceeding, should also be carefully examined, as it
may suggest issues or contain facts which may prove important. For
example, in In re Hwamei,73 the principal issue on appeal was incompe-
tency of trial counsel in failing adequately to investigate and prepare a
first degree murder case which resulted in imposition of the death
penalty. The clerk's transcript contained an affidavit for fees filed by the
court appointed trial counsel. The affidavit, showing only twenty hours
of trial preparation, provided persuasive evidence in support of appel-
lant's contention that trial counsel had been inadequate.
72. See, e.g., People v. Meals, 48 Cal. App. 3d 215, 224, 121 Cal. Rptr. 742, 748
(1975); People v. Kraus, 47 Cal. App. 3d 568, 578, 121 Cal. Rptr. 11, 18 (1975); Peo-
ple v. Eckstrom, 43 Cal. App. 3d 996, 118 Cal. Rptr. 391 (1975). For discussion of trial
counsel's duty to investigate the case and potential defenses, see Comment, Federal Ha-
beas Corpus-A Hindsight View of Trial Attorney Effectiveness, 27 LA. L. Rav. 784,
784-85 (1967); Comment, Right to Competent Counsel, supra note 67, at 371, 375.
73. 37 Cal. App. 3d 554, 112 Cal. Rptr. 464 (1974).
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In People v. Gloria,74 the reporter's transcript did not contain the
judge's oral jury instructions, but the clerk's transcript contained a copy
of the written instructions, which contained serious error. The attorney
general claimed that correct instructions had been given orally. The
conviction was reversed, either because of the erroneous instructions, or,
assuming the trial court had verbally given correct instructions, because
the defendant "[had] been denied his due process right to an accurate
record on appeal. '7
The clerk's transcript may also suggest error in certain pretrial or
post-trial proceedings which are not contained in the reporter's tran-
script.76 Discussion with appellant and trial counsel about those events
and an examination of the physical and documentary evidence at trial
should enhance appellate counsel's understanding of what happened at
those proceedings, and should aid him in deciding whether or not to
request augmentation of the record to include a reporter's transcript of
the proceedings.
Questioning of appellant and trial counsel about the case may
also lead to grounds for reversal which do not appear in the record. In
People v. Coleman,77 for example, counsel appointed by the court in an
automatic death penalty appeal discussed the case with appellant and his
trial counsel, read the district attorney's closing argument to the jury,
and thereupon concluded that appellant's prior felony conviction had
proved a major factor in the jury's decision to invoke the death penalty.
This conviction had been disclosed to the jury, without objections,
during cross-examination of appellant.
When he questioned the appellant further, counsel learned that the
prior felony had occurred in Virginia, that appellant's trial counsel in
that case had been appointed only a few minutes before the "trial," and
that appellant had plead guilty without inquiry by the court as to his
understanding of his constitutional rights. This information led appellate
counsel to question appellant's Virginia counsel, as well as his trial
judge, who since had become a justice of the Virginia Supreme Court.
Both of them confirmed appellant's story and signed declarations to that
74. 47 Cal. App. 3d 1, 120 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1975).
75. Id. at 7, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 537.
76. See, e.g., WriKIN, supra note 14, §§ 763, 765-66, 769. See also, Stout, Appel-
late Review of Criminal Convictions on Appeal, 43 CALIF. L. REV. 381, 395-96 (1955).
The clerk's transcript has been used to achieve a reversal in several cases. See, e.g.,
People v. Tealer, 48 Cal. App. 3d 598, 122 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1975); People v. Chapman,
47 Cal. App. 3d 597, 121 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975); cf. People v. Kirchner, 233 Cal. App.
2d 83, 43 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1965) (clerk's transcript used to achieve affirmance).
77. 71 Cal. 2d 1159, 459 P.2d 248, 80 Cal. Rptr. 920 (1969).
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effect prepared by appellate counsel. The declarations, along with those
of appellant and his California trial counsel, were attached to a petition
for habeas corpus prepared and filed by court appointed appellate
counsel with the California Supreme Court.78
Although the court found nothing in the record on appeal to
support appellant's contention concerning jury prejudice, the court is-
sued an order to show cause in the habeas corpus proceeding, in order to
determine "if necessary, whether the evidence of the prior conviction
vitiated the judgment before us on the automatic appeal." 79 Since the
conviction was reversed on grounds raised in the appeal, the issue raised
in the writ case was not reached by the supreme court, although the
lower court later decided it in appellant's favor. On retrial, evidence of
the prior conviction was stricken on the basis of the evidence secured by
appellate counsel. This time, the death penalty was not invoked, and
appellant received a life sentence.8 0
The facts in In re Hwamei8l further illustrate the possible effects of
counsel's investigation beyond the record. In that case, appellant had
been sentenced to death after being convicted on two counts of first
degree murder, armed robbery, two counts of kidnapping to commit
robbery, and two counts of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to
commit murder. At trial, several eye witnesses, as well as fingerprint
evidence, identified the appellant as Baltazar Garcia Estolas. The appel-
lant claimed, however, that he was Tomy Hwamei, not Estolas.
Prior to the trial, court-appointed trial counsel had arranged to
have appellant examined by a psychiatrist, but he had neglected to
inform the psychiatrist of the body of evidence that proved conclusively
that appellant was Estolas, not Hwamei. Lacking that crucial informa-
tion, the psychiatrist reported that appellant was sane, not delusional,
and that there was no reason to disbelieve that appellant was Hwamei.
The case proceeded to trial, at which the sole defense presented was
appellant's testimony that he was Hwamei and that he had never been in
California. The jury quickly convicted appellant and invoked the death
sentence.
78. See record, People v. Coleman, 71 Cal. 2d 1159, 459 P.2d 248, 80 Cal. Rptr.
920 (1969). See also People v. Shells, 4 Cal. 3d 626, 483 P.2d 1227, 94 Cal. Rptr.
275 (1971), in which trial counsel was held inadequate for failing to investigate whether
a charged prior conviction was a felony.
79. 71 Cal. 2d at 1169, 459 P.2d at 254-55, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 926-27.
80. See record, People v. Coleman, Crim. No. 40431 (Alameda County Super. Ct.
Apr. 29, 1970). See also Suggs v. United States, 391 F.2d 971, 976 (D.C. Cir. 1968)
(impeachment by a prior felony conviction).
81. 37 Cal. App. 3d 554, 112 Cal. Rptr. 464 (1974).
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Court-appointed appellate counsel was faced with a problem simi-
lar to that which had confronted the trial counsel-a client who contin-
ued to insist he was Hwamei. Nevertheless, appellate counsel, after
conferring with appellant and trial counsel, consulted the original psy-
chiatrist. When informed of the positive proof identifying appellant as
Estolas, the psychiatrist changed his opinion about appellant's sanity at
the time of trial and at the time of the offenses. Following up other
leads, appellate counsel contacted friends and relatives of Estolas, both
in the United States and the Philippines. 82 From these sources, he
derived a wealth of information attesting to appellant's personal and
familial history of insanity and mental illness. Another psychiatrist, after
examining all this information, joined in the conclusion that appellant
had been insane both at trial and at the time of the offenses.83
None of this information, of course, was contained in the record on
appeal; therefore, court-appointed appellate counsel prepared and filed
in the court of appeal a petition for habeas corpus, supported by
declarations of friends, relatives, and the psychiatrists. This evidence,
together with reports of two additional psychiatrists appointed by the
court of appeal, convinced the court that trial counsel had not adequate-
ly investigated the defenses of diminished capacity and insanity. The
court therefore reversed the conviction and granted the writ.84
At the retrial, based upon the information originally secured by
appellate counsel but extensively enlarged and developed by skilled and
dedicated trial counsel,85 Hwamei, invoking a "diminished capacity"
defense, was found not guilty of all counts of armed robbery, kidnap-
ping to commit robbery, and assault with a deadly weapon with intent
to commit murder; he was found guilty only of involuntary manslaugh-
ter, and then found not guilty by reason of insanity and committed to
Atascadero State Hospital.8
A deterrent to the suggested investigation by court-appointed ap-
pellate counsel of the entire case was pointed out by the dissent in
People v. Lang.87 Justice Clark noted that the appointment is for the
82. Id. at 561, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 468.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 563, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 469.
85. Trial counsel was Deputy Public Defender Jack Rosenberg, of the office of
the Public Defender, San Joaquin County. See record, People v. Estolas, No. 20753
(San Joaquin County Super. Ct., Mar. 24, 1975).
86. See Order for Commitment and Suspending Proceedings, People v. Estolas,
aka Hwamei, No. 20753 (San Joaquin County Super. Ct., filed Mar. 24, 1975).
87. 11 Cal. 3d 134, 520 P.2d 393, 113 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1974).
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appeal and that counsel is entitled to a fee and expenses only for work
on the appeal. Thus, although an appellate court could award fees and
expenses to appellate counsel for investigation of the entire case and
initiation of collateral attack,8" appointed appellate counsel should real-
ize that presently such effort must be made without expectation of
reimbursement. The appellate courts should, however, compensate
counsel, 9 both because this additional effort is part of counsel's consti-
tutional duty to provide adequate representation and because secur-
ing competent and thorough representation is a primary concern of the
appellate courts themselves. 90
Alternative Methods of Bringing New Evidence
Before the Appellate Court
By reasonably investigating the entire case, within and outside the
record on appeal, appellate counsel may discover facts which are not
contained in the record on appeal or which are only alluded to in the
record, but which, if developed by additional facts, might result in
reversal. Appellate counsel has available several methods to develop
those facts and to use them to appellant's benefit.
For example, counsel may consider filing in the trial court a
motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence or on
other statutory grounds.91 Once a notice of appeal is filed, however, the
trial court loses jurisdiction to entertain a motion for a new trial,9 2 to
88. See CAL. PEN. CoDE § 1241 (West 1970 & Supp. 1975); ef. Polakovic v. Supe-
rinor Ct., 28 Cal. App. 3d 69, 104 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1972).
89. If counsel's effort results in the court acting favorably, however, as it did in
Hwamei, appointed counsel may receive both reimbursement for necessary expenses and
the usual "honorarium" awarded by appellate courts. "Despite recent increases in fees
paid to appointed counsel there is great doubt whether the compensation received is rea-
sonable on a per-hour basis. For example a recent study in the First Appellate District
showed an average payment of $499.53 per case, with an average of 61/ hours -time
claimed per case; thus, after allowing for out-of-pocket expenses claimed by counsel,
compensation was only $6.83 per hour." 1975 JUDICiAL COUNcIL REPORT, supra note
2, at 20 n.3.
For a discussion of the need to improve the method for securing legal representation
for indigent appellants, see Langford, The Defense of Indigent Criminal Appellants-
Where Are We Now?, 50 CALI. ST. BJ. 173 (1975).
In Hwamei and Coleman, court-appointed counsel were awarded costs and hon-
oraria, but counsel was appointed to represent petitioner in each writ case after issue
of the order to show cause. See In re Hwamei, 37 Cal. App. 3d 554, 112 Cal. Rptr. 464
(1974); In re Coleman, 71 Cal. 2d 1159, 459 P.2d 248, 80 Cal. Rptr. 920 (1969).
90. Cf. Polakovic v. Superior Ct., 28 Cal. App. 3d 69, 104 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1972).
91. See CAL. PEN. CODE § 1181 (West 1970 & Supp. 1975).
92. See People v. Murphy, 70 Cal. 2d 109, 448 P.2d 945, 74 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1969);
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vacate its judgment,93 or to entertain a writ of habeas corpus94 or coram
nobis. 95 Thus, if an appeal has been filed, counsel has no effective
remedy in the trial court. 96
If the important additional facts are contained in the trial court
record but not in the appellate record, those facts can be included by
augmentation of the record on appeal pursuant to Rule 12 of the
California Rules of Court.97 If those facts are not contained in the trial
record, however, resort to this procedure will prove futile, because
augmentation is limited to inclusion of matters in the trial court record
which were not included in the normal record on appeal.9 8
Counsel may consider bringing those new facts to the attention of
the appellate court by asking the court to take additional evidence
outside the trial record pursuant to Rule 23(b) of the California Rules
of Court.99 That rule is available, however, only if the taking of the new
People v. Sonoqui, 1 Cal. 2d 364, 35 P.2d 123 (1934). See generally WITKN, supra
note 14, §§ 557, 637-38.
93. See People v. Sonoqui, 1 Cal. 2d 364, 35 P.2d 123 (1934); People v. Helsley,
41 Cal. App. 2d 935, 108 P.2d 97 (1940).
94. See France v. Superior Ct., 201 Cal. 122, 255 P. 815 (1927).
95. See People v. Haynes, 270 Cal. App. 2d 318, 75 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1969); cf.
People v. Esquibel, 44 Cal. App. 3d 591, 593, 118 Cal. Rptr. 748, 750 (1975).
96. The trial court, however, retains jurisdiction to grant bail pending appeal.
See CAL. Sup. CT. & CTS OF APP. R. 32; Molinari, Bail Pending Appeal in California,
1 U.S.F.L. REv. 217 (1967). The trial court also retains jurisdiction to consider and
order appointment of a psychiatrist to examine appellant pending appeal. In re Ketchel,
68 Cal. 2d 397, 399 n.2, 438 P.2d 625, 627 n.2, 66 Cal. Rptr. 881, 883 n.2 (1968).
97. Rule 12 reads in relevant part, "(a) [Augmentation] On suggestion of any
party or on its own motion, the reviewing court, on such terms as it deems proper, may
order that the original or a copy of a paper or record on file or lodged with the superior
court be transmitted to it, or that portions of the oral proceedings be transcribed, certi-
fied and transmitted to it, or that an agreed or settled statement of portions of the oral
proceedings be prepared and transmitted to it; and when so transmitted they shall be
deemed a part of the record on appeal .... ."CAL. Sup. CT. & CTS. OF APP. R. 12.
98. Thus, if the matter desired to be brought to the attention of the appellate court
is not contained in the trial court record, it may not be included by augmentation. See
People v. Brawley, 1 Cal. 3d 277, 461 P.2d 361, 82 Cal. Rptr. 161, 171 (1969); People
v. Pearson, 70 Cal. 2d 218, 449 P.2d 217, 72 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1969); CAL. SuP. CT.
& Crs. OF App. R. 33.
99. Rule 23(b), in relevant part, reads: "The court may grant or deny the appli-
cation in whole or in part, and subject to such conditions as it may deem proper. If
the application is granted, the court, by appropriate order, shall direct that the evidence
be taken before the court or a justice thereof, or before a referee appointed for the pur-
pose. The court . . . shall indicate the issues on which the evidence is to be taken.
Where documentary evidence is offered. . . the court may admit the document and add
it to the record on appeal." CAL. SUP. CT. & CrS. OF APP. R. 23(b). For a discussion
of the derivation of Rule 23(b) see People v. Pena, 25 Cal. App. 3d 414, 421, 101 Cal.
Rptr. 804, 807 (1972).
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evidence by the appellate court would result in affirmance0 ° or in
reversal and dismissal rather than reversal and new trial.' The rule
may not be invoked to secure "an appellate court's general reversal of a
judgment on the basis of newly discovered evidence presented in the
appellate court."' 02 Furthermore, Rule 23(b) is inapplicable in a crimi-
nal case unless a jury trial has been waived."0 3 Thus, in the usual case,
Rule 23(b) will not help appellate counsel solve the problem discussed
here.
If the issue to be developed is not contained in the record on appeal
as augmented, and appellate counsel nevertheless raises it, the appellate
court will not consider the issue, for an appeal is limited to so much of
the trial court record as is before the appellate court. 04 A problem
arises, however, if the issue is alluded to in the record but is not
sufficiently supported to the meritorious. If counsel nonetheless raises it
as is, the issue will probably be lost on the merits in the appeal, and the
appellate court's determination may be res judicata if it is raised again
subsequently by way of collateral attack.10 5
If counsel decides to defer raising the issue to which the record
alludes' until collateral attack,'0 7 there is a substantial risk that appel-
lant's position will be prejudiced. First, if counsel is court-appointed, the
appointment terminates at the conclusion of the unsuccessful appeal,
leaving the client without counsel in pursuing his collateral attack.'0 8
Second, a court considering the later collateral attack may refuse to hear
the issue on the grounds of undue delay, waiver, or failure to exhaust the
100. See, e.g., People v. Shaw, 237 Cal. App. 2d 606, 47 Cal. Rptr. 96 (1965).
101. People v. Benford, 53 Cal. 2d 1, 345 P.2d 928 (1959).
102. People v. Pena, 25 Cal. App. 3d 414, 422, 101 Cal. Rptr. 804, 807 (1972).
103. Id.
104. CAL. Sup. CT. & OrS. OF App. R. 13; see In re Hochberg, 2 Cal. 3d 870, 471
P.2d 1, 87 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1970); People v. Merriam, 66 Cal. 2d 390, 426 P.2d 161,
58 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1967).
105. See, e.g., In re Waltreus, 62 Cal. 2d 218, 397 P.2d 1001, 42 Cal. Rptr. 9
(1965). See also In re Sterling, 63 Cal. 2d 486, 407 P.2d 5, 47 Cal. Rptr. 205 (1965).
106. This procedure is often suggested. See ABA STANDARnDs, supra note 21, § 8.5;
2 CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAw PRACTICE, supra note 14, § 21.1.
107. In the normal case, collateral attack must be initiated in the trial court. CAL.
Sup. CT. & CTs. oF App. R. 56.
108. In California, a defendant has no constitutional, statutory, or decisional right
to counsel on collateral attack unless he "has stated facts sufficient to satisfy the court
that a hearing is required." People v. Shipman, 62 Cal. 2d 226, 232, 397 P.2d 993,
997, 42 Cal. Rptr. 1, 5 (1965); see also Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (state
defendant has no federal constitutional right to appointed counsel on discretionary ap-
peal); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (if state does provide for appeal as
a matter of right, it must appoint counsel for indigent appellants).
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remedy of appeal, 10 9 and vital witnesses or evidence may be lost during
the interim. Finally, the general rule is that issues which could have been
raised on appeal may not be raised by collateral attack,1 ' and the court
may deem matters alluded to in the record to be matters which could
have been raised.
Appellate Counsel's Duty Is To Collaterally Attack
the Conviction During Pendency of the Appeal
To solve the problem described above, it should be the duty of
appellate counsel to raise the issue while the appeal is pending, by filing
a petition for an appropriate writ"' in the appellate court in which the
appeal is pending. A series of California cases establish the validity of
this combined appeal-writ procedure." 2
109. "[I]t is the practice of this court to require that one who belatedly presents
a collateral attack such as this explain the delay in raising the question." In re Swain,
34 Cal. 2d 300, 302, 209 P.2d 793, 795 (1949). In re Razutis, 35 Cal. 2d 532, 536,
219 P.2d 15, 18 (1950) (waiver). But see In re Ward, 64 Cal. 2d 672, 414 P.2d 400,
51 Cal. Rptr. 272 (1966), (twenty year delay in collateral attack excused when issue
involved was excessive punishment). Compare WITKIN, supra note 14, § 796 with id.
§ 717 (1963 & Supp. 1973).
110. See In re Shipp, 62 Cal. 2d 547, 399 P.2d 571, 43 Cal. Rptr. 3 (1965); In re
Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d 756, 264 P.2d 513 (1953); In re Domingo, 268 Cal. App. 2d 642,
74 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1969). The courts often state that habeas corpus may not serve as
a second appeal. See In re Walker, 10 Cal. 3d 764, 781, 518 P.2d 1129, 1138, 112 Cal.
Rptr. 177, 187 (1974). But see In re Osslo, 51 Cal. 2d 371, 334 P.2d 1 (1958); In
re Bine, 47 Cal. 2d 814, 306 P.2d 445 (1957). The writ is proper, however, when a
defendant will have served his entire sentence before an appeal can be decided. See In
re Newbern, 53 Cal. 2d 786, 350 P.2d 116, 3 Cal. Rptr. 364 (1960); In re Solis, 274
Cal. App. 2d 344, 78 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1969). A writ is also proper when appeal is not
a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. See In re Ali, 230 Cal. App. 2d 585, 589, 41
Cal. Rptr. 108, 112 (1964); In re Solis, 274 Cal. App. 2d 344, 78 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1969).
In certain situations, a writ will lie when constitutional rights are involved even though
appeal was available and not utilized. See In re Hochberg, 2 Cal. 3d 870, 471 P.2d
1, 87 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1970). Finally, even if no constitutional right is involved, habeas
corpus may be allowed in a case in which the issue was not raised when it could have
been raised if "special circumstances" exist excusing the failure to raise the issue previ-
ously. See In re Carmen, 48 Cal. 2d 851, 313 P.2d 817 (1957).
111. The appropriate writ would normally be habeas corpus, but the name of the
writ sought in the petition by appellate counsel is not crucial; the court will treat the
document as a petition for the writ the court decides is appropriate. See WrrKiN, supra
note 14, § 771 (1973 Supp.).
112. See People v. Lang, 11 Cal. 3d 134, 520 P.2d 393, 113 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1974)
(suggesting this procedure); People v. Coleman, 71 Cal. 2d 1159, 459 P.2d 248, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 920 (1969); People v. Langley, 41 Cal. App. 3d 339, 116 Cal. Rptr. 80 (1974);
People v. Pena, 25 Cal. App. 3d 414, 101 Cal. Rptr. 804 (1972) (suggesting this proce-
dure); People v. Rinegold, 13 Cal. App. 3d 711, 92 Cal. Rptr. 12 (1971); People v.
Haynes, 270 Cal. App. 2d 318, 75 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1969) (suggesting this procedure).
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In In re Hwamei,113 court-appointed appellate counsel filed in the
court in which the appeal was pending a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus alleging inadequacy of trial counsel. Counsel decided to raise the
issue by way of writ because, having found the record on appeal on the
issue arguably insufficient to be meritorious, he wished to allege new
facts outside that record. Over objection of the attorney general that the
issue was already involved in the appeal and therefore not proper to be
raised by writ," 4 the court of appeal issued an order to show cause,
stating that "[s]ince this fundamental issue is also the main issue raised
on appeal, we have chosen to consolidate the habeas corpus proceeding
with the appeal."" 5
The combined appeal-writ procedure was also used in In re
Miller.""0 Inadequacy of trial counsel was again -the common issue. The
attorney general argued that since the issue was raised in the appeal, it
could not also be raised by writ. This argument was rejected, the court
stating that since the record on appeal was not complete on that issue,
"the only manner in which defendant can receive comprehensive appel-
late review of the basic constitutional issue he has raised is through
habeas corpus proceedings.""11 7 The judgment was reversed and the writ
granted. 1 8
In In re Ali"' the trial court had denied a continuance of the trial
when defense counsel failed to appear owing to illness. Appellant was
required to go to trial without counsel, was convicted, and appealed.
Since the record on appeal did not contain all of the facts about
counsel's illness, however, appellant sought relief by habeas corpus in
the supreme court, which transferred the petition to the court of appeal
to be consolidated with the pending appeal. Because the attorney gener-
al had unreasonably delayed in filing a reply brief on the appeal and
because appellant "would remain imprisoned [wrongfully], pending the
outcome of his appeal,"' 20 the court of appeal granted the writ, stating
113. 37 Cal. App. 3d 554, 112 Cal. Rptr. 464 (1974).
114. See records, In re Hwamei, 37 Cal. App. 3d 554, 112 Cal. Rptr. 464 (1974).
115. 37 Cal. App. 3d at 557, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 465.
116. 33 Cal. App. 3d 1005, 109 Cal. Rptr. 648 (1973).
117. Id. at 1010, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 652.
118. The petition for the writ was originally filed in the supreme court during
pendency of the automatic death penalty appeal. After abolition of that penalty in Peo-
ple v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972), the appeal
and the petition for the writ were transferred to the court of appeal. See 33 Cal. App.
3d at 1008, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 651.
119. 230 Cal. App. 3d 585, 41 Cal. Rptr. 108 (1964).
120. Id. at 589, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 111.
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that, "in the instant case, the remedy by appeal is neither speedy nor
adequate."'121
Nature and Advantages of the Writ Procedure
in Appellate Courts
Within the limits described above, and within the rule that habeas
corpus "may not be used instead of an appeal to review determinations
of fact made upon conflicting evidence after a fair trial,"'12 2 new facts
can be presented by a petition for a writ to show that the record on
appeal is not a complete record of the facts material to an issue and to
show with particularity the procedural, substantive, or constitutional
grounds that would compel a reversal. 123 A petition may be used to
make a showing of appellant's innocence,124 to point out errors under-
mining the guilt-finding process, and to demonstrate the unreliability of
the judgment and the prejudice to appellant.' 25 Within the limits men-
tioned, habeas corpus may be based on any grounds that could result in
a reversal, 26 including inadequacy of trial counsel, invalidity of guilty
pleas, and mental incapacity of the appellant at the time of the
offenses.
The burden is on the petitioner to present a prima facie case for
relief'27 on any asserted grounds, and he may do so by use of affidavits,
records, or other documents. 28 As the situation in In re Hwamei
demonstrates, this process affords appellate counsel a unique opportuni-
ty to retry the case in the appellate court. 12 9 If petitioner establishes a
121. Id. See also In re Baird, 150 Cal. App. 2d 561, 310 P.2d 454 (1957).
122. In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d 756, 760, 264 P.2d 513, 515 (1953).
123. See in re Smith, 2 Cal. 3d 508, 467 P.2d 836, 86 Cal. Rptr. 4 (1970); In re
Bell, 19 Cal. 2d 488, 122 P.2d 22 (1942); CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 1473-74 (West 1970);
cf. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969); 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970).
124. For a peremptory writ to be issued on a claim of newly discovered evidence
showing innocence, however, petitioner must show that the new evidence "will com-
pletely undermine" the prosecution's case and (1) "the new evidence is conclusive, and
(2) it points unerringly to innocence." In re Weber, 11 Cal. 3d 703, 724, 523 P.2d
229, 243, 114 Cal. Rptr. 429, 443 (1974). But see Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560
(1971) (Black, J., dissenting); Bines, supra note 9, at 958.
125. See, e.g., In re Sturm, 11 Cal. 3d 258, 521 P.2d 97, 113 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1974);
Smith v. Superior Ct., 68 Cal. 2d 547, 440 P.2d 65, 68 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1968). See gener-
ally, Bines, supra note 9, at 958; Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless Error, 59 VA. L. REV.
988, 1021 (1973),
126. See generally, WrrKIN, supra note 14, §§ 760, 764.
127. See In re Smith, 2 Cal. 3d 508, 467 P.2d 836, 86 Cal. Rptr. 4 (1970).
128. See In re Saunders, 2 Cal. 3d 1033, 472 P.2d 921, 88 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1970);
In re Bell, 19 Cal. 2d 488, 122 P.2d 22 (1942).
129. Numerous materials describe methods for preparing the various writs and
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prima facie case, an order to show cause (or alternative writ) is issued
by the court,130 requiring the state to file a return which may also
contain affidavits, records, or other documents. 131 A reply, called a
traverse, may then be filed by petitioner.
If no triable issues of fact are raised by the petition, return, and
traverse, the case will be decided on those documents without resort to a
referee.'3 2 Any triable issues raised by the documents and the record
will be heard in an evidentiary hearing, 3 3 normally held before a
superior court judge or a retired superior court judge.' 34 Here, appellate
counsel has a further unique opportunity to retry the case, this time with
oral testimony.'3 5 Also, in appropriate cases, the appellate court itself
may augment the facts before it. In Hwamei, for example, the court of
appeal appointed two psychiatrists to examine the petitioner and, after
reviewing their reports, granted the peremptory writ without an eviden-
tiary hearing.
Pursuant to decisional and statutory law,' 36 the referee at the evi-
dentiary hearing considers conflicting evidence, including oral testimony,
and renders to the appellate court a report containing findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and a decision on the issues referred. Nevertheless,
while the standard of review in a criminal appeal does not permit the
appellate court to disturb findings of fact supported by substantial
evidence, and resolves disputed facts in favor of the state,3 7 the stan-
enumerate the grounds on which they may be granted. See Sup. Cr. & CTS. OF APP.
R. 56.5. See generally, 2 CALIFORNIA CRuMNAL LAw PRACTICE, supra note 14 §§ 21.1-
.61; PRISON LAW PROJECT, A MANUAL ON HABEAS CORPUS FOR JAIL AND PRISON IN-
MATES (1974); WIrxN, supra note 14, §§ 811-815 (1963); Granucci, Review of Crimi-
nal Convictions by Habeas Corpus in California, 15 HAS'TINGS L.J. 189 (1963).
130. In re Hochberg, 2 Cal. 3d 870, 471 P.2d 1, 87 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1970).
131. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1480 (West 1970); see, e.g., In re Smith, 2 Cal. 3d 508,
467 P.2d 836, 86 Cal. Rptr. 4 (1970).
132. In re Saunders, 2 Cal. 3d 1033, 472 P.2d 921, 88 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1970); see
In re Hwamei, 37 Cal. App. 3d 554, 112 Cal. Rptr. 464 (1974) (peremptory writ
granted without reference). In re Waltreus, 62 Cal. 2d 218, 397 P.2d 1001, 42 Cal.
Rptr. 9 (1965) (writ denied without reference).
133. See In re Weber, 11 Cal. 3d 703, 523 P.2d 229, 114 Cal. Rptr. 429 (1974)
(writ denied); In re Hochberg, 2 Cal. 3d 870, 873 n.2, 471 P.2d 1, 3, 87 Cal. Rptr.
681, 683 (1970) (writ granted). See generally WrrMN, supra note 14, § 824-26.
134. WrrIN, supra note 14, § 821.
135. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1484 (West 1970); see, e.g., In re Branch, 70 Cal. 2d 200,
443 P.2d 174, 74 Cal. Rptr. 238 (1969); In re Lindley, 29 Cal. 2d 709, 177 P.2d 918
(1947).
136. See CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 1483, 1484.
137. People v. Bassett, 69 Cal. 2d 122, 443 P.2d 777, 70 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1968);
see generally WrrmN, supra note 14, §§ 683-85.
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dard of review of the referee's report in habeas corpus is more favorable
to the appellant-petitioner:
[A] referee's findings of fact are, of course, not binding on [the
appellate] court, [which] may reach a different conclusion on an
independent examination of the evidence produced at the hearing
• . . even where the evidence is conflicting . . . . However, where
the findings are supported by "ample, credible evidence" . . . or
"substantial evidence" . . . they are entitled to great weight. 138
The standard of review available to a defendant-petitioner is more
favorable to the defense than that available to a defendant-appellant. In
the writ case, the court makes an independent examination of the
record, whereas in the appeal, the court is bound by any substantial
evidence supporting the judgment of conviction. 139 This difference sug-
gests another reason for appellate counsel to invoke the writ remedy in
conjunction with an appeal.
Appellate Court Jurisdiction and Venue
of a Writ Proceeding
With regard to the suggested unitary appeal-writ procedure, each
California court of appeal and the state supreme court have original
jurisdiction'40 to entertain the writ, and the supreme court has statewide
venue, regardless of the residence or place of custody of the appel-
lant-petitioner. 14' It is questionable, however, whether the court of
appeal where the appeal is pending is the proper venue for a petition for
a writ filed by an appellant-petitioner who does not reside or is not
in custody within the territory of that court of appeal. In this situation,
some authorities have expressed the opinion that venue is not proper
even though the appeal is pending in that court,142 based on cases
holding that when no appeal is pending, venue for a petition for a writ is
proper only in a court of appeal located in the same territory in which
the petitioner is incarcerated. 43
138. In re Branch, 70 Cal. 2d 200, 203 n.1, 449 P.2d 174, 176, 74 Cal. Rptr.
238, 240 (1969); accord, In re Hochberg, 2 Cal. 3d 870, 873 n.2, 471 P.2d 1, 3, 87
Cal. Rptr. 681, 683 (1970).
139. See notes 137-38 supra.
140. "The Supreme Court, courts of appeal, superior courts, and their judges have
original jurisdiction in habeas corpus proceedings. Those courts also have original juris-
diction in proceedings for extraordinary relief in the nature of mandamus, certiorari, and
prohibition." CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 10. See In re Hochberg, 2 Cal. 3d 870, 873 n.2,
471 P.2d 1, 3, 87 Cal. Rptr. 681, 683 (1970).
141. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1508(a); WrrKIN, supra note 14, § 792 (1963 & Supp.
1973).
142. See In re Golia, 16 Cal. App. 3d 775, 778, 94 Cal. Rptr. 323, 325 (1971);
In re Rinegold, 13 Cal. App. 3d 723, 725 n.1, 92 Cal. Rptr. 18, 19 (1971).
143. See, e.g., People v. Brady, 30 Cal. App. 3d 81, 88 n.1, 105 Cal. Rptr. 280,
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The viability of such authorities, however, is questionable. Prior to
1966, the California Constitution restricted a justice of a court of appeal
to issuing writs of habeas corpus only within his appellate district.144 In
1966, the constitution was amended, repealing the former sections and
consolidating the writ power of the supreme court and the courts of
appeal into one section, which contains no territorial limits on the
habeas corpus power of the justices of the courts of appeal. At the same
time, however, the legislature enacted California Government Code
section 69109.15 This section contained the restriction on writ power
theretofore contained in the constitution. Finally, however, in 1969,
Government Code section 69109 was itself repealed' 46 and was replaced
by California Penal Code section 1508,' 4T which eliminated the territo-
rial limitation on the power of the courts of appeal to issue writs but
retained a limitation on those courts to make such writs heard ("return-
able") only in the appellate district of the issuing court. 48 Thus, it can
be argued that by repealing the limitation on issuing writs and retaining
284 (1973) (coram nobis); People v. Buccheri, 2 Cal. App. 3d 842, 845, 83 Cal. Rptr.
221, 223 (1969) (habeas corpus); People v. Williams, 238 Cal. App. 2d 585, 595, 48
Cal. Rptr. 67, 74 (1966) (habeas corpus and coram nobis). These cases speak in -terms
of "jurisdiction," but the issue is one of venue, not jurisdiction. See note 140 & accom-
panying text supra.
144. Compare "The [district courts of appeal] shall also have power to issue writs
of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, and habeas corpus . . . . Each of the justices
thereof shall have power to issue writs of habeas corpus to any part of his appellate
district . . . ." CAL. CoNsT. art. VI § 46 (1947) (emphasis added) with "The
[supreme court] shall also have power to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibi-
tion, and habeas corpus .. .. Each of the justices shall have power to issue writs of
habeas corpus to any part of the State . . . ." Id. § 4 (1947) (emphasis added).
Dicta in some cases, however, indicates that the geographic limitation did not re-
strict the power to issue the four named writs. See Older v. Superior Ct., 157
Cal. 770, 772-74, 109 P. 478, 478-79 (1910) (dictum); In re Mayen, 49 Cal. App. 531,
543-45, 93 P. 813, 818-19 (1920) (dictum).
145. Former section 69109 read in part: "Each of the justices of the courts of ap-
peal shall have power to issue writs of habeas corpus to any part of his appellate dis-
trict . . . ." Cal. Stat., 1966, ch. 161, § 21 at 717, repealed Cal. Stat. 1969, ch. 38,
§ 2, at 145.
146. Cal. Stat. 1969, ch. 38, § 2, at 145.
147. "(a) A writ of habeas corpus issued by the Supreme Court or a judge thereof
may be made returnable before the issuing judge or his court, before any court of appeal
or judge thereof, or before any superior court or judge thereof. (b) A writ of habeas
corpus issued by a court of appeal or a judge thereof may be made returnable before
the issuing judge or his court or before any superior court or judge thereof located in
that appellate district." CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 1508(a), (b) (West 1970).
148. Perhaps the purpose of this limitation is to prevent one appellate court from
making work for another appellate court. This limitation is similar to the rule that one
court of appeal lacks power to transfer a case to another court of appeal. CAL. Sup.
CT. & CTs. oF App. R. 20.
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only a limitation on hearing writs, the legislature intended to give courts
of appeal statewide venue in any writ case, whether filed alone or
combined with an appeal. 149
No definitive resolution of this problem has been provided. Never-
theless, one recent case does support the contention that statewide venue
exists. In In re Hwamei,'5 ° while an appeal was pending in the court of
appeal, a petition for a writ was filed in that court, even though Hwamei
was incarcerated in the judicial district of another court of appeal. The
attorney general moved to dismiss the petition on the ground of impro-
per venue. Nevertheless, the court of appeal issued an order to show
cause. The attorney general then filed a petition for a writ of prohibition
in the supreme court. The attorney general's petition was denied without
opinion,"' and the writ was considered and ultimately granted by the
court of appeal.
Furthermore, principles of sound judicial administration and com-
mon sense would place proper writ venue with the court of appeal where
the appeal is pending, regardless of where appellant resides or is con-
fined. If the petition were required to be filed with and heard by another
court of appeal, the potential for inconsistent, overlapping, and duplica-
tive decisions is apparent. Since the merits of the writ involve the validity
of the conviction under review on appeal by the court of appeal, that
court is obviously the court most familiar with the facts and the law of
the case, and is therefore the court that should hear the petition.
Moreover, the convenience of the state is best served by having the
appeal and the writ consolidated in one appellate court and processed by
only one office of the attorney general. 15 2
The California Supreme Court has adopted a procedure which
avoids the potential problem of overlapping adjudication of similar
issues. Petitions for a writ of habeas corpus filed with that court are
often transferred' 53 to the court of appeal in which the appeal is
pending. 54 Logic would seem to dictate that a petitioner should be able
149. See 1971 JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND
THE LEGISLATURE 23, 54-55; Horowitz, Practitioner's Guide to California Habeas Cor-
pus, 8 J. BEVERLY HILLS B. ASS'N 10, 16 (1974).
150. 37 Cal. App. 3d 554, 112 Cal. Rptr. 464 (1974).
151. See note 114 supra.
152. See 1971 JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND
THE LEGISLATURE 23, 51.
153. See CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 12.
154. See, e.g., People v. Lang, 11 Cal. 3d 134, 520 P.2d 393, 113 Cal. Rptr. 9
(1974); In re Golia, 16 Cal. App. 3d 775, 94 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1971); In re Rinegold,
13 Cal. App. 3d 723, 92 Cal. Rptr. 18 (1971).
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to petition directly for a writ in the court in which the appeal is pending,
as long as the supreme court allows the same result indirectly. In
analogous situations, rules have been established allowing superior courts
to transfer certain writs from the superior court in the territory where
the defendant was confined and in which the petition was filed, to the
original sentencing court in another county, because that court "normally
is more familiar with the facts of the case . ..."155 Unfortunately,
however, under existing court rules and legislation, the court of appeal
in which the petition for writ is filed does not possess the power to
transfer the petition to another court of appeal, in which the appeal is
pending.""
In order to clarify the situation regarding venue, the legislature
should enact a provision clearly placing venue in the court of appeal in
which the appeal is pending for writs filed attacking the conviction
being appealed. Even under the present circumstances, however, it is
submitted that writ venue is proper in the court in which the appeal is
pending. If a petition is presented to a court other than that in which the
appeal is pending, that court should refuse to file the petition, and
should note in its order of refusal that proper venue lies in the court of
appeal in which the appeal is pending. On the other hand, if the petition
is presented to the court in which the appeal is pending, and that court
refuses to file it because petitioner is not in custody or does not reside in
its district, counsel should file the petition in the supreme court with a
request that the petition be transferred forthwith to the court of appeal
in which the appeal is pending. By following these suggested proce-
dures, both counsel and the courts will promote efficient administration
of justice and judicial economy.
Toward Unitary Post-Conviction Review
The suggested procedure for consolidating collateral attack with
appeal is beneficial to the appellant because it provides, with the aid of
counsel, a prompt and complete attack on the conviction, avoids the
risks inherent in other approaches, and reduces the normally inordinate
155. In re Haro, 71 Cal. 2d 1021, 1025, 458 P.2d 500, 503, 80 Cal. Rptr. 588, 591
(1969); see People v. Tenorio, 3 Cal. 3d 89, 96 n.2, 473 P.2d 993, 997, 89 Cal. Rptr.
249, 253 (1970) (exercise of judicial discretion to dismiss a charged prior conviction
which would affect sentencing); In re Montgomery, 2 Cal. 3d 863, 868, 471 P.2d 15,
18, 87 Cal. Rptr. 695, 698 (1970) (retroactive application of -rule excluding use against
defendant of the prior testimony of an "unavailable" witness). But see Pope v. Superior
Ct., 9 Cal. App. 3d 644, 88 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1970) (superior courts should not transfer
to the original sentencing court a challenge to parole revocation).
156. Sup. Or. & CTs. oF App. R. 20.
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amount of time that elapses between sentencing and subsequent collater-
al attack. The procedure is beneficial to judicial administration because
it tends to eliminate multiple, successive litigation15 7 and the consequent
drain on scarce judicial and legal resources. The procedure suggested by
this article is analogous to, and consistent with, "unitary" post-convic-
tion relief systems advocated by many sources.
The American Bar Association (ABA) proposes a standard in-
volving a "unitary post-conviction remedy"'1 "8 procedure which, while
acknowledging the traditional rule that post-conviction relief should not
be available until the appeal is concluded, advocates a "sufficiently
flexible" system, which permits "postponed" appeals so that issues
outside the record can be considered in a post-conviction proceeding
prior to the appeal. 15 9 It also allows the post-conviction procedure to
originate in the appellate court'° and to consist of a unitary proceeding
there involving both the appeal and the post-conviction attack.'
The ABA procedure allows counsel to seek comprehensive grounds
for relief, unhindered by procedural or substantive restrictions common
to writs. 162 Those grounds include not only traditional bases for collater-
al attack, but also "evidence of material facts, not theretofore presented
and heard, which require vacation of the conviction or sentence in the
interest of justice."' 63 Collateral attack on this latter ground is allowed
because "there exists a close relationship between the factual issues that
such motions raise and the other grounds for post-conviction
relief."1"4
Many commentators have also advocated a unitary post-conviction
157. Cf. People v. Shuey, 13 Cal. 3d 835, 533 P.2d 211, 120 Cal. Rptr. 83 (1975)
(multiple appeals, law of the case, and res judicata).
158. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 21, § 1.4.
159. Id. § 2.2(b). In an Illinois case, the appellate court was faced with a direct
appeal from a conviction and an appeal from denial by the trial court of a petition for
post-conviction relief. The court of appeal vacated the direct appeal and stayed all
proceedings therein while it reversed and remanded for a hearing in the post-conviction
case. The court ordered the direct appeal reinstated when and if, after a hearing below,
the post-conviction petition was dismissed and a new judgment of conviction entered.
People v. Garrett, 26 Ill. App. 3d 786, 326 N.E.2d 143 (1975).
160. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 21, § 1.4.
161. Id. § 2.2, commentary.
162. Id. § 2.1.
163. Id. § 2.1(v).
164. Id. § 2.1, commentary. "The best course in that situation probably is to ar-
range postponement of the appellate review of conviction and sentence until the new is-
sues are tried, in a post-conviction proceeding, if necessary. If relief is not granted, both
actions can be consolidated for appeal." Id. § 2.2, commentary.
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remedy procedure.1 5 Numerous states have adopted some form of a
unitary post-conviction act,16s and the trend appears to be in that
direction.1 67 The California legislature has not adopted such a proce-
dure, although it has been advocated and discussed.' 68 Until some
unitary procedure is adopted in California, the procedure suggested here
is an acceptable vehicle for accomplishing the objectives of a unitary
system.
Conclusion
In order to discharge the constitutional duty to provide adequate
representation, appellate counsel must urge all arguable grounds for
attacking a conviction. The primary avenue of attack is normally the
appeal, which is limited to arguable issues contained in the record on
appeal. Nonetheless, if the appellant is to receive the "comprehensive
appellate review"' 69 to which he is entitled, there should be neither re-
strictions limiting counsel's search for grounds for reversal solely to the
record on appeal, nor restraints on his methods of seeking such reversal.
Rather, counsel should be required to make a reasonable investigation of
the entire case to determine if there are arguable grounds for reversal
outside the record on appeal. At a minimum, this duty should require
counsel to confer with appellant and trial counsel. Should this inquiry
raise doubts as to the sufficiency of the record on appeal, a duty should
arise to investigate further, and, when appropriate, to initiate concurrent
collateral attack in the appellate court in which the appeal is pending.
Such a combined appeal-writ procedure provides appellant with a
prompt and comprehensive attack on the conviction. It also conserves
scarce judicial resources by bringing before one appellate court at an
early stage all the potential grounds for reversal in one proceeding.
The resulting harm to appellant if appellate counsel fails to provide
165. See, e.g., Bines, supra note 9, at 977; Browning, The Trial Courts: Some
Comments from a Prosecutor, 49 CALIF. ST. B.J. 447 (1974); Robinson, Proposal and
Analysis of a Unitary System for Review of Criminal Judgments, 50 B.U.L. REV. 485
(1974),
166. See, ABA STANDARDS, supra note 21, app. C.
167. There is a similar trend toward "omnibus" pretrial proceedings. See, e.g., FED.
R. Cium. P. 17.1; R. NIMMER, THE OMNmus HEAmNG FINAL REPORT, AMauCAN BAR
FO1JNDATiON REPORT, 45, 46 (Tentative Draft 1973); Myers, The Omnibus Proceeding;
Clarification of Discovery in the Federal Courts and Other Benefits, 6 ST. MARY's L.J
386 (1974).
168. See People v. Williams, 238 Cal. App. 2d 585, 597, 48 Cal. Rptr. 67, 75
(1966); Note, Post-Conviction Remedies in California Death Penalty Cases, 11 STAN.
L. REv. 94, 113-14, 118-19 (1958).
169. In re Miller, 33 Cal. App. 3d 1005, 1010, 109 Cal. Rptr. 648, 652 (1973).
November 1975] CRIMJINAL APPELLATE ADVOCACY
adequate representation is affirmance of the conviction, rather than
conviction itself. This consequence, however, is no less serious to appel-
lant than the conviction, and it should be no less serious to our judicial
system and sense of justice. Moreover, the harm to the attorney from
inadequate appellate representation may be malpractice liability't ° or
sanctions.17 1
There is a possibility that expanding the duty of appellate counsel
may increase the instances of inadequate appellate representation. Since
each instance of inadequate representation could require a court to
170. Inadequate appellate representation may give rise to a claim of malpractice
against appellate counsel. See generally, Kaus & Mallen, The Misguiding Hand of
Counsel-Reflections on 'Criminal Malpractice', 21 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1191 (1974); Note,
Liability of Court-Appointed Defense Counsel for Malpractice in Federal Criminal Pros-
ecutions, 57 IowA L. REV. 1420 (1972); Note, Right of the Indigent Client to Sue his
Court-Appointed Attorney for Malpractice, 33 LA. L. REV. 740 (1973); Note, Improving
Information on Legal Malpractice, 82 YALE L.J. 590 (1973).
171. Like trial counsel in a criminal case, appellate counsel may be faced with a
range of sanctions if he fails to provide adequate representation. See United States v.
Rivera, 473 F.2d 1372 (9th Cir. 1972) ($500 fine); United States v. Smith, 436 F.2d
1130 (9th Cir. 1970) ($2,000 fine); Smith v. Superior Ct., 68 Cal. 2d 547, 560 n.5,
440 P.2d 65, 73, 68 Cal. Rptr. 1, 9 (1968) (public reproval); In re McDermit, 96 N.J.
17, 114 A. 144 (1921) (disbarment). The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility
states that incompetent representation is a violation of the disciplinary rules. AMERICAN
BAR ASS'N, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR-6-101 (1969). See Outcault &
Peterson, Lawyer Discipline and Professional Standards in California: Progress and
Problems, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 675, 693-96 (1973) (arguing that DR-6-101 should be nar-
rowly construed).
A California case held that when both a defendant and his appointed trial counsel
object, the trial court has no "statutory or inherent power" to relieve counsel on the
ground that he is incompetent. Smith v. Superior Ct., 68 Cal. 2d 547, 440 P.2d 65,
68 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1965). California provides by statute: 'The attorney in an action or
special proceeding may be changed at any time before or after judgment or final deter-
mination, as follows: 1. Upon the consent of both client and attorney, filed with the
clerk, or entered upon the minutes; 2. Upon the order of the court, upon the application
of either client or attorney, after notice from one to the other ....... CAL. CODE CIv.
PRoc. § 284 (West 1970).
The supreme court has held that when trial counsel is improperly removed, the con-
viction must be reversed, regardless of the competency of the substituted counsel, the
fairness of the trial, or the guilt of the defendant. See People v. Crovedi, 65 Cal. 2d
199, 417 P.2d 868, 53 Cal. Rptr. 284 (1966); see also Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S.
3 (1954). Of course, counsel's performance may cause an appellate court to inquire
whether that "performance was such as to give petitioner good cause to have new coun-
sel appointed." In re Banks, 4 Cal. 3d 337, 342, 482 P.2d 215, 219, 93 Cal. Rptr. 591,
595 (1971). If there is good cause and defendant requests that counsel be removed,
the court may relieve counsel. See People v. Marsden, 2 Cal. 3d 118, 465 P.2d 44, 84
Cal. Rptr. 156 (1970); cf. In re Ali, 230 Cal. App. 2d 585, 589, 41 Cal. Rptr. 108,
111 (1964) (appellate counsel was relieved at request of petitioner even though the court
regarded counsel's work as effective).
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reinstate an appeal172 or to hear a writ, there is a potential increase in
the burden on the judicial system. A similar result has been cited as one
reason for the reluctance of courts to find trial counsel inadequate, since
each instance of inadequate trial representation can require a new
trial.17 3 Nevertheless, the functional effect on the judicial system of a
reinstated appeal is less than that of a new trial. Therefore, the slight
increase in the burden on the judicial system which may result from
expanding appellate counsel's duty should not deter courts from estab-
lishing such an expanded duty.
Hopefully, by fulfilling the duties as described in this article and by
using the combined appeal-writ procedure for seeking a reversal, appel-
late counsel will minimize claims of inadequacy and will in fact provide
the adequate representation required by the constitution.
172. Appeals were reinstated in the court of appeal in United States ex rel. Johnson
v. Vincent, 370 F. Supp. 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); People v. Lang, 11 Cal. 3d 134, 520
P.2d 393, 113 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1974); People v. Rhoden, 6 Cal. 3d 519, 420 P,.2d 1143,
99 Cal. Rptr. 751 (1972); In re Smith, 3 Cal. 3d 192, 474 P.2d 969, 90 Cal. Rptr. 1
(1970).
173. See Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 20-
26 (1973).
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